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PROTECTING NEWS SOURCES: PLAYBOY
EXTENDS PUBLISHER'S RIGHTS
When one thinks of Playboy Magazine, images of sensually photo-
graphed women, juxtaposed among slick ads and racy jokes, immediately
come to mind. Protecting a newsperson's sources is not an idea one usu-
ally associates with "The House That Hef Built." But a California court
of appeal held in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court I that the
magazine's publisher is protected against compelled disclosure of undis-
seminated notes and editorial materials regarding an interview, when the
publisher is not a party to the underlying civil action.2 This protection is
derived from section 1070 of the California Evidence Code ("section
1070")' and article I, section 2 of the California Constitution ("article I,
section 2").'
1. 154 Cal. App. 3d 14, 201 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1984).
2. Id. at 29, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
3. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1986). Since the 1974 amendment, § 1070 has
provided:
(a) A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed upon a
newspaper, magazine or other periodical publication, . . . or any person who has
been so connected or employed, cannot be adjudged in contempt by a judicial . ..
body having the power to issue subpoenas, for refusing to disclose, in any proceeding
. .. the source of any information procured while so connected or employed for
publication in a newspaper, magazine or other periodical publication, or for refusing
to disclose any unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving,
or processing of information for communication to the public. . . .[r/ (c) As used in
this section, "unpublished information" includes information not disseminated to the
public by the person from whom disclosure is sought, whether or not related informa-
tion has been disseminated and includes, but is not limited to, all notes, outtakes,
photographs, tapes or other data of whatever sort not itself disseminated to the public
through a medium of communication, whether or not published information based
upon or related to such material has been disseminated. [emphasis added.]
4. CAL. CONST. art. I § 2. Article I, § 2 was amended June 3, 1980 to include language
almost identical to that which appears in § 1070. Article I, § 2 provides [with changes
emphasized]:
(b) A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed upon a
newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, . . . or any person who has
been so connected or employed, shall not be adjudged in contempt by a judicial . . .
body having the power to issue subpoenas, for refusing to disclose [omission] the
source of any information procured while so connected or employed for publication,
or for refusing to disclose any unpublished information obtained or prepared in gath-
ering, receiving, or processing of information for communication to the public. ...
[ ] (c) As used in this subdivision, "unpublished information" includes information
not disseminated to the public by the person from whom disclosure is sought.
whether or not related information has been disseminated and includes, but is not
limited to, all notes, outtakes, photographs, tapes or other data of whatever sort not
itself disseminated to the public through a medium of communication, whether or
not published information based upon or related to such material has been
disseminated.
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The court refused, however, to allow Playboy Enterprises ("Play-
boy") the right to claim similar protection for the whereabouts of the
freelance writer, Ken Kelley, who conducted the interview in question.
Accordingly, Playboy could be subject to contempt proceedings for re-
fusal to obey a court order to disclose the information about the writer.5
The circumstances surrounding Playboy's request for protection are out-
lined below.
The September 1982 edition of Playboy Magazine contained the ar-
ticle "Playboy Interview: Cheech and Chong," written by freelance jour-
nalist Ken Kelley. The individuals interviewed were Richard "Cheech"
Main and Thomas Chong, better known as the comedy team of Cheech
and Chong. The article covered a broad range of topics, including the
pair's first movie, "Up In Smoke." Although not addressed in Kelley's
article, Main and Chong sued their former accountants, financial advi-
sors, and business managers, Greene & Reynolds, for breach of contract
and breach of fiduciary duty with respect to the film. Specifically, Main
and Chong alleged in their lawsuit that Greene & Reynolds persuaded
them to enter into an unfavorable contract with the producers of "Up In
Smoke," without discussing Greene & Reynolds's business relationship
with, and financial interest in, the film's production company.
In February and March of 1983, Greene & Reynolds served subpoe-
nas re depositions and subpoenas duces tecum on Playboy, commanding
the production of specified notes, tapes and records of the article.
Greene & Reynolds sought these materials in order to verify the accu-
racy of contested statements, attributed to Main in the article. Greene
& Reynolds contended that the materials were necessary to impeach the
credibility of Main and to show that Main and Chong were not
defrauded.6
The materials subpoenaed included all documents in Playboy's pos-
session relating to the interview; all audio and video recordings which
were used in any way as source material for the resulting article; and all
documents relating to the researching, writing and editing of the article.7
Greene & Reynolds also demanded the attendance of Playboy's custo-
dian of records and of a designated representative pursuant to section
2019(a)(6) of the California Code of Civil Procedure.8 Neither appeared.
However, Playboy's counsel voiced objections, later dropped on appeal,
to the court's lack of jurisdiction over the officers who resided outside of
5. Playboy, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 29, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
6. Id. at 18, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
7. Id. at 19, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 211-12.
8. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 2019(a)(6) (West 1986).
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California; counsel also objected, under article I, section 2, to disclosure
of the materials.9 Several court orders later,". the Superior Court di-
rected Playboy to produce to Greene & Reynolds the material as
subpoenaed. "
Playboy petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate. The
court issued the writ, directing the trial court to vacate its order compel-
ling Playboy to produce the source material requested, and to make a
new and different order compelling Playboy to disclose the current office
and/or residence addresses and telephone numbers of Ken Kelley. 2 The
court relied on California appellate and supreme court case law as well as
rules of statutory construction to define the protection intended by article
I, section 2.13 The court stated that "unpublished information," as used
in article I, section 2, referred to "factual information that is within the
newsperson's knowledge, whether contained in source material or in
memory" and "expressly and unequivocally refers to the physical records
constituting a newsperson's source material."' 4 The court construed the
legislative intent as protection of information and source material of un-
disseminated information, even if related or derivative information has
been published.' 5
This broad construction protects "off the record" comments. Com-
pelled production of Playboy's source materials, editorial drafts and
working papers was not enforceable by contempt unless Playboy had pre-
viously disseminated any of the particular materials to the public.' 6
Greene & Reynolds argued that the information sought had been
9. Playboy, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 19, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
10. Greene & Reynolds caused an order to show cause re failure to appear at deposition to
be issued. At a hearing on that order, Greene & Reynolds were ordered to use diligent efforts
to locate and depose Ken Kelley concerning his interview of Marin and Chong. Greene &
Reynolds were unsuccessful. A second order to show cause was issued on that basis. Id. at 19,
201 Cal. Rptr. at 211-12.
11. Id. at 19, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 212. The court order read:
(a) Each and every document (as defined below but specifically including all tapes,
cassettes and the like) in its possession or under its control which constitute or me-
morialize any interview of [Marin and Chong] by Ken Kelley, which document in
any way was used in preparing, writing or researching the article. . . ; (b) Each and
every document which reflects or relates to the editing of the interview for publica-
tion in the article, as well as the writing of the article (as used in this order, "docu-
ment" is defined to include but not be limited to, any audio or video tapes, cassettes.
or rewrites of the article, and any notes or other records of any type reflecting the
writing or research of this article) . ...
12. Id. at 29, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
13. Id. at 20-22, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14.
14. Id. at 21, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
15. Id. at 22, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14.
16. Id. at 22, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 214. The court also noted that trial courts are relieved of
the burden of sorting which facts have already been disseminated.
1986]
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previously disseminated, as the article was virtually an exact transcrip-
tion of the tape-recorded interview. They also argued that Playboy had
no interest in refusing to disclose the materials to protect "source confi-
dentiality," since the contested statements were directly attributed to
Main in the article.1
7
Greene & Reynolds derived their arguments from CBS, Inc. v. Supe-
rior Court."8 That case involved a television broadcast on the dangers of
certain drugs, and included a segment about undercover police opera-
tions. CBS agreed to conceal the officers' identities until their under-
cover roles ended. The officers were called as witnesses at the hearing on
CBS's motion to quash a subpoena compelling disclosure of their source
material in an underlying criminal case. The CBS court focused on the
protection section 1070 gave to confidential sources and stated that the
purpose of agreed confidentiality was lost.19 The Playboy court found no
support for so limiting the application of section 1070 and dismissed the
argument as being in direct conflict with the statutory interpretation it
adopted.2°
The Playboy court similarly dismissed the argument that the Cali-
fornia legislature, in adopting article I, section 2 in 1980, ratified the judi-
cial "construction" given to section 1070 by the CBS court.2 , Instead,
the Playboy court recognized that the legislative intent in adopting article
I, section 2 was clearly contrary to this construction. 22 Greene & Reyn-
olds failed to see that disclosure of confidential sources is but one protec-
tion enumerated by article I, section 2. The court stated that all data not
itself disseminated to the public is protected against disclosure, whether
or not published information based upon this material had been dissemi-
17. Id. at 23, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
18. 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1978).
19. Id. at 250, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
20. Playboy, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 23, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
21. Id. at 24, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 215. This general rule of construction was stated in Los
Angeles Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 54 Cal. 2d 684, 355
P.2d 905, 8 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1960): "When legislation has been judicially construed and a subse-
quent statute on the same or on an analogous subject is framed in the identical language, it will
ordinarily be presumed that the legislature intended the language as used in the later enact-
ment would be given a like interpretation." The act before the Transit Authority court incor-
porated "the exact language ... found in the earlier statutes, and it is unlikely that the same
words would have been repeated without any qualification in a later statute in the absence of
an intent that they be given the construction previously adopted by the courts." 54 Cal. 2d at
688-89, 355 P.2d at 907, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 3.
22. Playboy, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 24, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 215. This exception to the "general
rule of construction" was articulated in County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie, 19 Cal. 2d 634. 644.
122 P.2d 526, 532 (1942).
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nated.23 The Playboy court also noted that section 1070 was not con-
strued by the CBS court; section 1070 was held inapplicable in CBS
based upon considerations other than statutory language.24
Greene & Reynolds argued that the undisseminated materials would
merely confirm or amplify the accuracy of Marin's statements in the arti-
cle, that nothing new would be disclosed in the source materials, and that
this would render the constitutional protection inapplicable.2"
The court found that the material fell squarely within the ambit of
article I, section 2 protection, whether the published information was an
exact transcription of source material or a summary. By necessity, the
court said, published material that confirms, or discredits, undis-
seminated source material is "related to" or "based upon" unpublished
source material.26
The Playboy court then turned to the issue of competing interests,
that is, whether Playboy's constitutional protection must yield to the dis-
covery efforts of Greene & Reynolds. In addressing this issue, the court
noted that it was not clear whether Greene & Reynolds had "any cogni-
zable right to discovery of sufficient magnitude to create conflict with
article I, section 2 and necessitate a balance of these competing
interests."
27
In Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court,2 8 the constitutional
right to privacy, acknowledged to extend to banking records absent com-
pulsion by legal process [emphasis supplied], was balanced against the
23. Playboy, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 24, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 214. This position is consistent with
the reasoning of Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608
(1979). That case involved a newsman's motion to quash a subpoena compelling disclosure of
material pertaining to interviews with the prosecution's primary witness in a murder trial. The
defendant sought the materials to impeach the witness. The Court of Appeal held that unpub-
lished information was not limited to material that might lead to the disclosure of a newsper-
son's confidential sources, but encompassed all information acquired by the newsperson in his
professional capacity which he has not disseminated. Id. at 397-98, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
However, the newsman's contempt charge was upheld for other reasons relevant only in the
context of underlying criminal suits. Id. at 403, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
24. CBS, 85 Cal. App. 3d at 250, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 426. Thus, the Playboy court could
have dismissed the "general rule of construction" argument (see supra note 21) on the basis
that Greene & Reynolds's interpretation of § 1070 conflicted with the judicial construction
that had actually been accepted in California (see supra note 23).
25. Playboy, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 23, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
26. Id. at 23-24, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 215. "[Since article I, § 2] provides protection for all
such material, [it] must be deemed reflective of the presumption that a publisher's refusal to
disclose is a prima facie demonstration of an interest sufficient to require protection." Id. at
24, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
27. Id. at 25, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
28. 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1975).
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governmental interest in resolving civil claims.29 That court held that
confidential customer information was potentially discoverable.3" But
the Playboy court limited Valley Bank to its facts, since a customer's
constitutional right to privacy is inherently qualified, while "the constitu-
tional newsperson's protection under article I, section 2. . .is express in
its specific and absolute purpose to shield newspersons for refusal to dis-
close information or material expressly. . . falling within the scope of its
protection."31
In examining the scope of section 1070's protection, the Playboy
court noted that section 1070 did not extend to situations where newsper-
sons are defendants in libel or civil rights violation actions. There, the
newsperson could be compelled by the trial court to disclose undis-
seminated material or information. Accordingly, the reporter is subject
to the same discovery actions as other civil litigants.32 This was the pre-
cise set of circumstances surrounding KSDO v. Superior Court.33
The KSDO court balanced the protection of unhindered news gath-
ering against the obligation of citizens to give relevant testimony. The
case enumerated criteria to be used when employing this balance.34 In
dictum, the KSDO court speculated that the criteria might require disclo-
sure by a nonparty newsperson to accommodate discovery. The Play-
boy court believed that this would allow compelled disclosure of
undisseminated materials in many cases and would, in effect, vitiate the
newsperson's protection. Additionally, since KSDO was distinguishable
from Playboy in two critical aspects-the newsperson in KSDO was a
party to the civil action, and the newsperson relied only upon the indirect
protection of the first amendment rather than the direct protection of
article I, section 2-"whatever conclusions were volunteered by the
KSDO court concerning the level of protection available to nonparty
29. Id. at 657, 542 P.2d at 979, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
30. A bank is required, however, to notify the customer of the pendency and nature of the
proceedings. This affords the customer an opportunity to protect his interests. Id. at 658, 542
P.2d at 980, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
31. Playboy, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 26, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
32. Id. "Section 1070 ... provides an immunity from being adjudged in contempt; it
does not create a privilege. Thus, the section will not prevent the use of other sanctions for
refusal of a newsman to make discovery when he is a party to a civil proceeding." Stats. 1965,
c. 299, 1070, Comment, Assembly Comm. on the Judiciary.
33. 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 186 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1982). However, the reporter in KSDO was
protected against compelled disclosure under a general first amendment interest in the free
flow of information to the public. Id. at 386, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
34. Id. at 384-85, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 216-17. The criteria were: (1) the nature of the pro-
ceeding, (2) the status of the newsperson as a party or nonparty, (3) alternative sources of the
information, and (4) the relationship of the information to the heart of the claim.
35. Id. at 385, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
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newspersons are obiter dictum."36
The court observed that the legislature's decision to elevate the pro-
tection of section 1070 to the constitutional level manifested an intent to
afford newspersons the highest level of protection under state law.37 The
court interpreted this as favoring the interests of the press in confidential-
ity over the state's interest in having civil actions determined upon a full
development of material facts. Simply because the legislature did not
specifically protect newspersons who are a party to an action, the express
protection granted to nonparty newspersons in civil actions cannot be
eviscerated by the courts.38
The general state interest in full civil discovery is subject to the limi-
tations found in the Evidence Code. 39 These limitations act as privileges.
The Playboy court reasoned that there must exist similar legislative au-
thority to protect compelled disclosure of information by a newsperson.
4
0
Thus, article I, section 2 affords protection of equal strength to the limi-
tations of the Evidence Code. Otherwise, section 1070 would have less
"dignity than other statutes and . . . the people's further acts in elevat-
ing this protection to the state constitutional level [would be rendered]
meaningless."'" The court concluded that the unqualified protection of
article I, section 2 did not have to yield to Greene & Reynolds's discov-
ery interest in the context of their underlying civil action.42
The court recognized that Greene & Reynolds demonstrated to the
trial court unsuccessful yet diligent efforts to locate Ken Kelley. Playboy
refused to disclose his whereabouts based on its general policy. This in-
formation was not protected by article I, section 2 as Kelley's address
was not obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing infor-
mation for communication to the public. The court held, therefore, that
Playboy could be subject to contempt proceedings for refusing to obey an
order to disclose this information. 43 The Superior Court was directed to
vacate the order compelling Playboy to produce the source materials of
"Playboy Interview: Cheech and Chong." Instead, the Superior Court
had to issue a new and different order compelling Playboy to disclose the
36. Playboy, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 27, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 217. Also, the information sought
from the KSDO reporter was available from other sources. KSDO, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 386,
186 Cal. Rptr. at 217-18.
37. Playboy, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 27, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 217-18.
38. Id. at 27-28, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
39. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 900-1060.
40. Playboy, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 28, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 29, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
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current office and/or residence addresses and telephone numbers of Ken
Kelley.44
The Playboy court interpreted article I, section 2 consistent with the
free press clause of the first amendment. It recognized the necessity of
protecting confidential news sources45 as well as the people's desire to
maintain unrestrained journalism.46 It showed, in the words of the court
in Rosato v. Superior Court,47 an "extraordinary and sensitive solicitude
for the preservation of a free and untrammeled press as an indispensable
guardian of our freedom."48 The court stood fast against an attempt to
invade the realm of an official immunity that the people granted to the
magazine publisher.
Simultaneously, the court recognized a need, in limited instances, to
reveal source material. It accomplished this by expressly confining appli-
cation of the decision to those instances where the reporter is a nonparty
faced with a contempt charge. The court left the judicial door wide open
to imposing other sanctions when the reporter is directly involved in the
underlying civil litigation. This interpretation of article I, section 2 has
since been adopted by the Califonia Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Supe-
rior Court. 
49
The basis for differentiating between a party reporter and a nonparty
reporter, however, is tenuous. Section 1070 does not specifically distin-
guish the two classes of newspersons. The Playboy court drew support
from an Assembly committee comment that had been written nineteen
years earlier; the comment was never explicitly adopted in subsequent
amendments to the statute.5" Additionally, when the privilege was ele-
44. Id.
45. "Compulsory disclosure of confidential news sources is said to impede first amendment
functions in two ways: by drying up sources that are available under the promise of confidenti-
ality or anonymity, and by deterring future investigation and information gathering which rely
upon confidential sources." Comment, The Newsman's Qualified Privilege. An Analytical Ap-
proach, 16 CAL. W.L. REV. 331, 339 (1980).
46. The broad scope of California's shield law and the fact that it has now been em-
bodied in one of the first articles of the state's constitution reflect a paramount public
interest in the maintenance of a vigorous, aggressive and independent press capable
of participating in robust, unfettered debate over controversial matters, an interest
which has always been a principal concern of the First Amendment ....
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 89 F.R.D. 489, 495
(1981), quoting Baker v. F&F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972).
47. 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975).
48. Id. at 212, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
49. 37 Cal. 3d 268, 690 P.2d 625, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1984). The qualified reporter's
privilege was upheld based on a balancing of criteria similar to those employed by the KSDO
court (see supra note 29). Id. at 284, 690 P.2d at 635, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
50. Section 1070 has been amended four times since it was first enacted in 1965.
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vated to the constitutional level, the legislature failed to embody the dis-
tinction in the words of the statute itself.
Speculating about what the court sought to gain by compelling dis-
closure of Ken Kelley's address and phone number is equally problem-
atic. Arguably, this order will direct Greene & Reynolds to the
information that they wished to use in their defense. However, this line
of reasoning requires the exclusion of freelance journalists, such as Ken
Kelley, from the enumerated classes of newspersons who are protected
by section 1070 and article I, section 2. Considering the lack of statutory
support for this proposition, as well as the vulnerability to challenges
based on equal protection grounds,5" it is not surprising that the court
failed to denote the rationale behind compelling disclosure of Kelley's
personal information.5 2 Thus, we can only assume that under the Play-
boy holding, Ken Kelley would be able to claim the same immunity from
prosecution by "hopping" under the protection of article I, section 2.
Charles H. Baren
51. Ken Kelley could argue that his fundamental right to freedom of expression has been
infringed by excluding him from the protected class of newspersons.
52. This is not to suggest that the information should be constitutionally protected, but
instead proposes that the court should have clarified why Greene & Reynolds were entitled to
a court order for production of this information.
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